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ABSTRACT
Advisory Firm Employee Ownership and Performance in Separately Managed Accounts
by
Samuel White Yates
April 2017

Chair: Conrad Ciccotello
Major Academic Unit: Finance

I describe in detail the structure of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and how
those accounts compare to and differ from mutual funds and hedge funds. I then examine
how employee ownership of advisory firms — that is, firms in which employees have
partnership or stock interests — affects the performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square
of each firm’s SMA portfolios. In testing 14,484 different portfolios from more than
1,100 different advisory firms from 1995 to 2015, I find that SMAs at firms with
employee ownership outperform SMAs at firms without it. The greatest impact is in the
25–50% employee-ownership range. Positive returns, risk, and R2 all decrease as
employee ownership increases beyond 50%, but SMA performance levels remain above
those of firms in which the portfolio manager has no employee ownership. I also find that
the Sharpe ratio is negatively related to employee ownership, reflecting a deterioration of
risk-adjusted returns at higher employee-ownership levels. These results suggest both that
the presence of advisor employee ownership is a significant, positive indicator for SMA
performance and that those advisory firms assume more idiosyncratic risk to achieve

x

these higher returns. For investors, my results show that employee ownership of advisory
firms can be used as a differentiating factor to aid them in making SMA choices between
portfolios with otherwise similar characteristics.

INDEX WORDS: Separately Managed Accounts, SMA’s, Employee Ownership,
Performance
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I.INTRODUCTION
“In terms of financial innovation, remember that the trend is toward institutional money
management, delegated portfolio management.”
—Gary Gorton (2010)

From its historical roots as a domain for institutional investors and pension funds, the
investment industry has grown to a multitrillion-dollar asset class by expanding its reach to
high net worth investors around the globe. According to the Investment Company Institute
(2013), more than $20 trillion dollars is currently invested in separately managed accounts
(SMAs), which Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2013) describe simply as asset portfolios
“managed by a professional management firm.” In contrast, $13 trillion is invested in openended mutual funds, $2.6 trillion in hedge funds, and $265 billion in closed-ended mutual
funds. And, as Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2016) estimate, these reports of assets held
in SMAs may be small; according to their research, as of 2012, the total amount invested in
delegated asset managers is $43 trillion.
As early as 1981, Sharpe indirectly called attention to SMAs when he studied optimal
allocation and diversification in pension funds; since then, however, researchers have largely
ignored SMA performance, makeup, and characteristics — despite the fact that they make up
more than 50% of the investable market in securities. As I describe here, SMAs’ long neglect
in the investment research universe is partially due to the difficulty of defining what
constitutes an SMA and what differentiates it from investment brethren such as mutual and
hedge funds. A second challenge is the lack of high-quality data to analyze. Here, I resurrect
the study of SMAs by examining their performance in relation to a single characteristic:
employee ownership of advisory firms. This type of ownership is not a manager’s coinvestment in the fund’s underlying assets, as described in the recent paper by Banerjee,
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Stukalo, Yates, and Agarwal (2016); rather, it is a form of ownership — such as through
stock or partnership interest — in the overall management company. As my research shows,
the differential between employee-owned and non-employee-owned advisory firms is easily
identifiable in SMAs. Using this variable to separate the two groups could be a valuable tool
in helping investors discern the likelihood of positive outcomes for their investments.
I.1

Defining Employee-Owned Advisory Firms
The primary question here is whether employee ownership of advisory firms makes a

difference in the characteristics and outcomes of the investment portfolios that the firms
manage. To more fully define “employee-owned advisory firms,” we can look to a question
in the Informa database that I use for this study. As Appendix D shows, the question simply
asks SMA managers the percentage of their advisory firm that is owned by employees; their
answers ranged from 0 to 100%.
The broader question of what defines employee-owned firms can be answered only
generally and in anecdotal terms from the data. Generally speaking, an employee-owned
advisory firm is a private, smaller firm that forms as a partnership; its primary source of
almost all revenue is separate account management. Typically, non-employee-owned firms
are publicly traded, much larger, and offer diversified financial services. Appendix F offers
examples of an employee-owned firm and non-employee-owned firm that report to the
Informa database. Hahn Capital Management LLC is 100% employee-owned and reports
managing approximately $1.6 billion in assets; it has 10 employees and has been in operation
since 1988. Blackrock is a publicly traded company that reports zero firm ownership by its
portfolio managers; it reports total assets under management of $4.89 trillion. Also founded
in 1988, Blackrock has 10,000 employees.
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I.2

Differentiating Separately Managed Accounts from other Investment Vehicles
Having offered a general SMA description — that is, “a portfolio of assets managed

by a professional” (Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2013) — I now focus on describing the unique
features and characteristics that distinguish SMAs from other asset classifications, such as
mutual and hedge funds (see Appendix C).

Insert Appendix C

A major benefit of the SMA structure is that, unlike mutual funds (Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997; Brown, Goetzmann, and Park, 1997; Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, 2014) and
hedge funds (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011), SMA portfolios offer less incentive to
engage in window dressing — that is, reporting higher holdings in winners and lower
holdings in losers. Because mutual funds and hedge funds are pooled investment vehicles
and report holdings only on a quarterly basis, funds can invest in different instruments during
the quarter and “clean them up” just before it is time to report. By their very nature, SMAs
are the most transparent asset vehicle available to investors. Each account is individually
held and most (if not all) account holders can see their holdings online at any time. Further,
SMAs do not have a regulatory mandate to disclose their holdings. Because SMA investors
have an individual record of their account transactions — that is, the buys and sells — they
would see any attempt at window dressing for what it was. Thus, with the incentives
removed, SMA managers accrue no benefit by engaging in window dressing.
SMA transparency not only provides a defense against window dressing, it typically
exhibits another characteristic that can benefit the investor and increase performance:
monitoring. Because the very nature of an SMA is a custom account designed for each
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investor, investors can monitor their holdings in almost real time, adding another dimension
to the equation. Further, as Mullally (2016) points out, significant shareholders exercise
substantial influence and governance over the management firms in which they invest. Here,
I will argue that large investors act in a similar manner. In most SMA structures, the only
income that the firm generates is the fee it charges, which is calculated as a percentage of the
firm’s total assets under management (AUM). If large investors are monitoring their
accounts carefully and constitute a significant percentage of a manager’s total assets, those
investors will not only have carte blanche access to the manager and the team, they may also
influence the manager from a personal standpoint. Large investors are also likely to have
their own analytic team and software to ensure that the manager is performing and investing
in a conventional manner. Monitoring also impacts the platforms that distribute the SMA. As
part of their service to their clients, wire houses and banks often employ their own team of
analysts and may even use an outside consultant to monitor and report on SMAs.
Finally, transparency and low barriers to entry/exit can work for or against an
investor. In the SMA space, evidence shows that picking winners is not only possible but
beneficial to the investor and, according to Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010), is a workable
strategy. This approach comes at a cost — usually higher fees — and, once the manager
posts persistent outperformance, large capital inflows follow, resulting in reduced alpha.
I.3

SMAs and Performance, Asset Flows, and Investor Behavior
Some researchers have compared SMA performance and risk characteristics with

those of mutual funds and other investment vehicles. These researchers include Ippolito and
Turner (1987); Lakonishok (1992); Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993); Del Guercio and
Tkac (2000); Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010); Peterson, Iachini, and Lam (2011); Elton,
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Gruber, and Blake (2013); and Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2016). On the whole, they
found that SMAs outperformed mutual funds and performed at a similar level to index funds
(Elton, Gruber, and Blake 2013).
Two other literature streams are prevalent in the study of SMAs. As the following
examples show, the first stream focuses on the relationship between asset flows and
performance. Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013) found conflicts of interest involving
investment banks and asset management of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional
funds as they chronically underperformed their counterparts. Ferson and Khang (2002) used
SMA flow data to devise a new performance measure using conditioning information to look
for bias in return-based tests. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) found that, in contrast to mutual
fund investor counterparts, SMA investors punish poorly performing managers by
withdrawing assets under their management; the researchers also found that these
institutional SMA investors do not run proportionately to recent winners.
The second stream focuses on SMA investors and the fund’s behavior. This research
includes Goyal and Wahal (2008), who reported that excess returns from institutional SMA
manager terminations were indistinguishable from zero, although occasionally the changes
made were positive. Heisler (2007) also looked at the hiring and firing of SMA managers
and found that both benchmarks and total returns over a long period had a strong influence
on investor decisions. Del Guercio and Tkac (2000) found that SMA investors are likely to
be more sophisticated than mutual fund investors, and that they usually perform higher-level
due diligence than the typical mutual fund investor. For example, both vehicles include
quantitative screenings, but SMA investors are more likely to rely on risk-adjusted measures
— such as Jensen’s alpha and tracking error — for performance. Del Guercio and Tkac also
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found that SMA investors are much less likely to chase excess returns than a mutual fund
investor. Further, SMA investors often focus on nonperformance measures as well, including
one-on-one meetings and the manager’s reputation. However, like hedge fund investors,
SMA investors are more likely to pull money from an underperforming fund than are mutual
fund investors.
I.4

Employee Ownership of Advisory Firms and Performance, Risk, and R-square
Another key question is: When selecting SMAs to invest in, what are some key

differences among SMA portfolios that can guide investors to make better choices? Elton,
Gruber, and Blake (2013) gives us a clue as to one possible differentiator: “Separate
accounts offered by management companies that have mutual funds with the same objective
do not outperform the mutual funds with which they are matched. Rather, it is the
independently managed separate accounts, and in particular, those with management
companies organized as partnerships, that have the best performance” (p. 1719).
For the remainder of this paper, my focus will on answering and quantifying the
observation that Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2013) made concerning how an advisory firm’s
ownership structure affects performance. The SMA structure’s flexibility makes this research
possible because SMA advisors have varying ownership structures, while hedge funds
advisors are overwhelmingly set up in partnerships and mutual fund advisors have been
historically owned by financial services companies.
To investigate this question, I will focus on how employee ownership of advisory
firms impacts SMA performance, risk, and R-square characteristics using three hypotheses.
The first hypothesis (performance) proposes that portfolios managed by principals who have
some percentage of firm ownership will outperform those who do not have incentives
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beyond those stipulated by their employment contracts. This hypothesis aligns line with a
larger body of literature concerning incentives and performance. I limit my discussion here
to the difference between employees and owners. That is, I am testing the hypothesis that
portfolio managers with an ownership stake in their company outperform those portfolio
managers who are employees only.
The second hypothesis (risk) predicts that employee owners will achieve these
returns using more idiosyncratic risk in their portfolios, signaling that they are better
informed/more skilled managers than employee-only portfolio managers. I define
idiosyncratic risk as the portion of total risk that is unaccounted for by systematic risk of the
market. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) found that idiosyncratic risk matters to a portfolio’s
return characteristics. This hypothesis will test the assertion that a positive relationship exists
between the amount of total risk taken by employee-owned advisory firms and
outperformance in comparison to their non-employee counterparts. This hypothesis will also
clearly distinguish between manager co-investment in their underlying portfolios and
managerial ownership in the corporate structure. Banerjee, Stukalo, Yates, and Agarwal
(2016) found that, as co-investment increased, the idiosyncratic risk increased, but only to a
certain point; at that point, the manager began to decrease risk-taking.
The third hypothesis (R-square) proposes that employee owners will be less
correlated to the market. A negative R-square observation will show that a manager who has
an ownership stake in a portfolio will exhibit less correlation to the market while achieving
higher returns. This will also test the findings of Titman and Tiu (2011), who suggest that
hedge funds with low R-square outperform funds with higher R-square.
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I test all three hypotheses using data from the Informa Investment Solutions PRN
enterprise database. Informa is a publicly traded company that serves commercial,
professional, and academic communities in various sectors by creating and providing access
to content and intelligence that helps people and businesses work smarter and make better
decisions faster (for more, see http://informa.com/about-us/informa-at-a-glance). The PRN
enterprise database contains more than 18,000 separately reporting portfolios from more than
1,100 different companies. Each portfolio reports individual returns for its particular
strategy. For example, Aberdeen Asset Management PLC reports on more than 52 different
portfolios across different strategies and investments, ranging from an international equity
portfolio to a US high-yield portfolio.
I begin my analysis by examining the influence of employee ownership on
performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square. To do this, I run a series of tests to determine
whether employee ownership has any effect on these characteristics. The tests use return,
standard deviation (SD) of return, and four generally accepted models of risk that build upon
one another: the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) one-variable model (Sharpe, 1966);
Fama and French’s three-factor model (1993); Carhart’s four factor model (1997); and Fung
and Hsieh’s seven-factor model (2004).
I obtained the employee ownership of advisory firms variable from the firm’s
answers to an annual questionnaire (see Appendix D). Unfortunately, if the firm updates or
changes this answer, it does not change answers from previous years. As I explain in detail
later, I account for this lack of annual variation in numbers by clustering the standard error
term and using years in the regressions.
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The results from these regressions begin to tell a story — namely, that employee
ownership of advisory firms does influence returns positively and significantly, leading to an
average of .338% annual outperformance over the 20-year period. This result alone would be
of keen interest to investors. All factor models reinforce the direction of the coefficients,
with a range of 0.038 to 0.120 positive alpha generations for the portfolios with employee
ownership. As I layer in complexity and test for risk, I find that the SD of returns for
employee-owned portfolios is 1.365% higher than nonemployee-owned portfolios. Similar
results for direction are observed across all factor models, and they are all significant to the
1% level or better. When I test for R-square, I find that it is negative across all factor models
with a range of –0.005 to –0.010. All of the previous results were significant to the 1% or
better level, with the exception of age in the Fama and French model (Fama and French
1993) and the Fung and Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004). Based on these observations, I
conclude that employee-owned portfolio managers take more idiosyncratic risk that is less
correlated to the market to achieve their returns.
Having observed these results, I divide the employee-owned percentages into
quartiles using 0.0–25% employee-owned as a lagged indicator, then follow with greater
than 25% to less than or equal to 50%; greater than 50% to less than or equal to 75%; and
greater than 75% to less than or equal to 100%. This shows a linear decrease in outsized
returns, with the largest return residing in the second quartile of 0.806%, then decreasing to
0.319% in the third quartile and to 0.076% in the fourth. While employee ownership was
beneficial across all quartiles, the benefits decreased in a linear direction from the first
through the fourth quartiles. The first two quartiles were significant to the 1% and 5% level,
respectively, while the fourth quartile result was not significant. Similar linear patterns were
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captured across all models, with the highest observation in the Carhart model (Carhart 1997)
at 0.190% and the lowest observed in the CAPM model at 0.012%.
When I examined the influence of employee ownership on risk, I found a similar
linear pattern among the quartiles. The SD of return was positive and highest at the second
quartile at 1.853%, with the third and fourth quartiles decreasing to 1.299% and 0.707%,
respectively. All three observations were significant to the 1% level or better. The pattern
followed across all factor models; all were positive, with the largest observation from the
CAPM model at 1.788% in the second quartile and the smallest in the Fung and Hsieh model
(Fung and Hsieh 2004) at 0.409% in the fourth quartile.
Finally, I examined the influence of employee ownership of advisory firms on Rsquare, and observed an increase in the R-square as employee ownership increases. The
second quartile shows a higher negative R-square at –0.004 compared to the fourth quartile,
which had a negative R-square of –0.002. Both observations were significant to the 1% level
or better. The third quartile also reported a –0.002 but was not significant. The Carhart model
(Carhart 1997) was the only model that captured significance across the board at the 1%
level or better with observations of –0.013, –0.008, and –0.007 in the second, third, and
fourth quartiles, respectively.
These results strongly suggest that employee ownership in an advisory firm has a
salutary effect on performance, idiosyncratic risk-taking, and R-square for the SMAs that the
firm is managing. By running the results through four of the most prominent factor models in
academic literature — CAPM, Fama and French (Fama and French 1993), Carhart (Carhart
1997), and Fung and Hsieh (Fung and Hsieh 2004) — I was able to capture intricate patterns
that would have been undetectable using any one model alone. Then, by further dividing the
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data into quartiles, I observe the levels at which employee ownership has the most
pronounced effect.
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II.DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
II.1

Data Sources
The data provider is the Informa Investment Solutions (IIS) PSN Enterprise

investment manager database. Informa’s PSN is a global database of more than 1,100
investment managers, representing more than 5,000 US and international investment
products. PSN is a primary data collector, with each firm reporting directly to it. Each firm
has more than 1,000 data points. The database contains information for 18,414 total funds,
with 6,000 actively reporting. The service began collecting returns in 1979. The funds
classify into 12 categories: Collective Trust, Commingled Funds, Exchange Traded Funds,
Fund of Funds, Hedge Funds, Limited Partnerships, Managed Account (wrap), Mutual Fund,
Offshore Fund, Single Representative Account, and Separate Account Composite. Of these
12 categories, 14,484 of reporting funds classify as Separate Account Composite. The
second largest classification is Managed Account (wrap), with 1,196 funds reporting. A
feature of the database is that, in addition to AUM, returns, and numerous other
characteristics, it also reports employee-ownership percentage. In Appendix G, I define the
categories used for calculating SMA performance as age, size, and ownership. Unlike Busse,
Goyal, and Wahal (2010), who tested only active portfolio managers, I include the entire
database of reporting firms for 1995–2015, as my hypothesis focuses on the influence of
employee ownership on performance, risk, and R-square of all SMAs over the study period. I
use 1995 as a starting point because, according to Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010), the
database had survivorship concerns that were rectified beginning in 1995.
As Appendix B shows, the one drawback in this literature is that the data for
reporting employee-ownership percentage is not collected in a time series manner. To
account for the time invariance of my independent variable, I cluster the standard errors.
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Clustering the standard errors by firm corrects the standard error by accounting for the fact
that the error terms are correlated. I will also strongly argue that, although the percentages of
employee ownership may change over time, there will be almost no cases where a company
reports employee ownership, then no employee ownership, then employee ownership once
again. If anything, there would be a high likelihood of an upward bias in the reporting of the
non-employee-owned numbers.
The reason is straightforward. A company may go from employee-owned to nonemployee-owned in two ways: through a buyout or through an initial public offering (IPO).
In both cases, the likelihood of either a company (in the buyout case) or a group of investors
buying stock in an IPO for an underperforming company is very remote. As we have seen for
mutual funds, hedge funds, and SMA portfolios, strong performance equals inflows.
Investors buy cash-flow companies that are growing their revenue.
One example of a company going from employee-owned to non-employee-owned is
Silvercrest Asset Management. Silvercrest was founded in 2002 as a private partnership
structured as a Limited Liability Corporation. It offers seven different SMAs to its clients:
Equity Income, Focused Value, Large Cap Value, Multi Cap Value, Special Situations Muni,
Smid Value, and Small Cap Value. All of the portfolios are ranked in the top quartile of
performers over the past 10 years, with one ranking first. Until 2013, Silvercrest was a
partnership owned substantially by its employees. In June 2013, the company went through
an IPO. After that date, it no longer listed any employee ownership in the database. In effect,
the salutatory benefits of employee ownership accrued to the non-employee numbers,
actually narrowing the performance gap between the two groups.
Source: http://psn.informais.com/help/psn_enterpriseV2/WebHelp/index.htm
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II.2

Variable Construction
I employ six measures for performance; all measures are for the period 1995–2015

unless otherwise stated. Return is the portfolio’s average annual return for the period. The
Sharpe ratio is the 20-year average of the portfolios’ monthly excess returns — that is, the
stated return minus the risk-free rate, divided by the SD of the returns during the same
period. I then estimate alpha using four widely accepted models: CAPM Alpha is a (Sharpe
1966), Fama and French Alpha is a three-factor model (Fama and French 1993), Carhart
Alpha is a four-factor model (Carhart 1997), and Fung and Hsieh Alpha is a seven-factor
model (Fung and Hsieh 2004). The formulas for these regressions follow.
CAPM

𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑎 (𝑟𝑚 -𝑟𝑟𝑓 ),
where
•
•
•
•

a = asset,
𝑟𝑟𝑓 = a risk-free security’s rate of return,
𝑟𝑚 = the expected return of the broad market, and
𝛽𝑎 = the assets beta.

Fama and French three-factor model

r = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽3 (𝐾𝑚 - 𝑅𝑓 ) + 𝑏𝑠 ∙ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝑏𝑣 ∙ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛼,
where
•
•
•
•
•

𝑅𝑓 = a risk-free rate of return,
𝛽 = beta of the portfolio,
𝐾𝑚 = market portfolio return,
SMB = small minus big market capitalization, and
HML = high minus low book to market ratio.

Carhart four-factor model
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𝑅 − 𝑅𝑓 = a + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 ) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑈𝑀𝐷,
where
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

R = return of the asset,
𝑅𝑓 = a risk-free rate,
a = the unexplained return,
Mkt = US market return,
HML = high minus low book to market ratio,
SMB = small minus big market capitalization, and
UMD = up minus down (the momentum factor that mimics the portfolio’s return).

Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model

𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖 𝐵𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽2,𝑖 𝑋𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽3,𝑖 𝐶𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽4,𝑖 𝐸𝑀𝐹 + 𝛽5,𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝐹
+ 𝛽6,𝑖 𝐵𝑀𝐹 + 𝛽7,𝑖 𝐶𝑆𝐹,
where
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

BTFF = bond trend-following factor,
XTFF = currency trend-following factor,
CTFF = commodity trend-following factor,
EMF = equity market factor,
SSF = size spread factor,
BMF = bond market factor, and
CSF = credit spread factor.

I then examine the influence of the percentage of employee ownership on
performance, risk, and R-square using Return, CAPM Alpha, Fama and French Alpha, Fung
and Hsieh Alpha, and the Sharpe ratio, with Age and Size as control variables. I also look at
the influence of employee ownership as a dummy variable on performance, risk, and Rsquare using the same regressions mentioned above. Alpha is calculated as an in-sample
regression intercept. For each company in each year, I run the regression against factors and
get alpha (intercept) and R-square. I then multiply alpha by 12 to annualize it.
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II.3

Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics of employee ownership, performance,

idiosyncratic risk, and R-square measures over the 20-year period from January 1995 to
December 2015.

Insert Table 1 here

As the table shows, the mean employee-ownership percentage of the sample is
51.150%, the mean return is 9.021%, and the mean Sharpe ratio is 0.880. The mean annual
alphas from the four models range from 0.617 to 1.109%. The average idiosyncratic risk for
the four models ranges from 6.83 to 12.19%. The range of the R-square is from 0.091 to
0.659. For control variables, the mean portfolio age is 8.49 years; the mean portfolio size is
$543.1 million AUM. I report the 1995–2015 findings using monthly returns. To capture a
reliable age for the portfolios reporting, I also included the 1985–1995 time frame. I further
restrict the data to only SMAs and similar portfolios and to reported employee ownership. If
the fund did not answer the question in Informa, the funds were shown as N/A and excluded
from the sample. Using this time period yielded 18,380 reporting portfolios; of those, 11,751
reported employee ownership of greater than zero while 6,629 funds reported employee
ownership as zero. Of the remaining portfolios, 64% reported some employee ownership.
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III.RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, PERFORMANCE,
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK, AND R-SQUARE
I begin my analysis by conducting tests to analyze the relation between employee
ownership and performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square.
III.1

Influence of Employee Ownership on Performance

Table 2 shows the relationship between employee ownership and performance.

Insert Table 2

Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that employee ownership is both positive and
significant at 1% level or better for all factor models in relation to performance, with the
exception of Sharpe ratio, which was negative and significant. The range of the factor
models was from 0.0003 to 0.001. Also, the modeled Return coefficient is positive (coeff =
0.001) but not significant. This result implies that higher employee ownership leads to higher
returns through higher alpha. The negative Sharpe ratio coefficient (coeff = –0.0001)
indicates a very slight to almost nonexistent drag on portfolios’ excess returns, which are an
interesting conundrum as all of the other factor models reported a positive coefficient.
When Age is added as a control factor, the results were positive and significant at the
5% level (coeff = 0.012). Age was significant at the 1% or better level only in the Fung and
Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004) and was negative (coeff = –0.003). The Sharpe ratio
was positive and significant at the 1% level or better (coeff = 0.006). The result implies that
the longer a manager is in business, the better the performance, although alpha may be
negatively affected. Interestingly, when I add size as a control variable, the result turns
negative (coeff = –0.284) and is significant at the 1% level or better. Size is also negative and
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significant across all factor models at the 1% level or better with a range of –0.024 to –0.040.
The Sharpe ratio is negative and significant at the 5% level (coeff = –0.004). This result
suggests that SMA managers may have some of the same capacity constraint challenges that
Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007) found in their study of hedge funds. The regression
for the former table is as follows:

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
24
∑20
𝑖=1 ∑𝑘=4 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
where
•
•
•
•
•

III.2

Return = a performance measure (annual return or a corresponding factor alpha),
EmplOwnership = employee ownership in percentage terms,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log (AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.

Influence of Employee Ownership on Risk

Table 3 shows the relationship between employee ownership and risk.

Insert Table 3

Consistent with my hypothesis, employee ownership is positive and significant at the
1% level or better for the SD of returns and across all models in relation to risk. The SD of
return was positive at 0.008. The factor models’ range was 0.004–0.008. The Age and Size
control variables were both negative and significant to the 1% or better level across all factor
models with the coefficients for Age ranging from –0.046 to –0.073. The coefficients for Size
ranged from –0.059 to –0.152. These results indicate that while Age does increase the SD of
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returns in younger and smaller portfolios, as the manager gains assets and manages over time
ownership results in lower risk-taking. The regression for Table 3 is as follows:

𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
24
∑20
𝑖=1 ∑𝑘=4 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
where
•
•
•
•
•

III.3

Risk = a measure of risk (SD of returns as a measure of total risk or SD of residuals
of corresponding factor models as a measure of idiosyncratic risk),
EmplOwnership = employee ownership in percentage terms,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log (AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.

Influence of Employee Ownership on R-square
Table 4 shows the relationship between employee ownership and R-square.

Insert Table 4

Consistent with my hypothesis, I find a negative relation between portfolio R-square
and employee ownership, significant at 1% or better for all factor models except Fung and
Hsieh (Fung and Hsieh 2004). For example, the CAPM coefficient on employee ownership
is negative (coeff = –0.00002) and significant at the 1% level. When adding Age as a control
variable, the results are significant and positive at the 1% level or better (coeff = 0.0002).
However, when adding Size as a control variable, the results turn negative and significant at
the 1% or better level (coeff = –0.001). This implies that higher employee ownership during
the prior year is associated with lower R-square over the following year; that diminishes with
age, but turns lower again as portfolio managers increase their AUM. This result also implies
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that managers with an ownership position are more likely to have better skills and
information than non-owners. Interestingly, the coefficient of the quadratic term of employee
ownership is significantly positive across all models. As employee ownership increases,
managers tend to become more risk averse. This tendency is logical, as partnership may
represent a significant portion of the managers’ net worth and they therefore may take fewer
risks in the portfolios in return for a stable company, especially as the organization grows its
assets. The regression for the Table 4 is as follows:

𝑅𝑡2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
24
∑20
𝑖=1 ∑𝑘=4 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
where
•
•
•
•
•

R2 = a measure of factor models fit (R-square of a corresponding factor model
regression),
EmplOwnership = employee ownership in percentage terms,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log (AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.
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IV.INFLUENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP USING A DUMMY VARIABLE ON
PERFORMANCE, RISK, AND R-SQUARE
I divided the data into two sets, using a dummy variable of (1) if employee ownership
is greater than zero and (0) if employee ownership is reported as zero. I then conducted tests
to analyze the relation between employee ownership and performance, idiosyncratic risk, and
R-square to paint a broader picture of employee ownership’s effect on SMA portfolios.
IV.1

Influence of Employee Ownership (Dummy Variable) on Performance
Table 5 shows the relationship between employee ownership (dummy variable) and

performance.

Insert Table 5

Consistent with my hypothesis, the relationship between employee ownership and
performance is positive and significant at a 1% or better level across return and all factor
models. The Sharpe ratio is again negative. The coefficient for Return (coeff = 0.338) is of
particular interest which implies that investors in portfolios with employee ownership of
greater than zero received a 0.338% higher return annually over the study’s 20-year period
than investors who put their capital with portfolio managers who had no employee
ownership. The alphas generated from the factor models were positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level or greater with a range of 0.038 to 0.120. The Sharpe ratio was
once again negative and statistically significant at the 1% level or better (coeff = –0.071).
When adding the control variable of Age, the results were positive and statistically
significant at the 10% level (coeff = 0.011) for Return, but were once again negative and
statically significant (coeff = –0.003) in the Fung and Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004);
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this is similar to the findings of the broader performance statistics reported in Table 2. Size
also reflected similar results to those shown in Table 2 in that the return was negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level or better (coeff = –0.277) and the factor models were
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level or better with a range of –0.023 to –
0.040. Finally, the Sharpe ratio was negative and statistically significant at the 5% level
(coeff = –0.003). The regression Table 5 is as follows:

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1
20 24

+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
𝑖=1 𝑘=4

where
•
•
•
•
•

Return = a performance measure (annual return or a corresponding factor alpha),
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = the employee-ownership dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
employee ownership is positive,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log(AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.

4.2 Influence of Employee Ownership (Dummy Variable) on Risk
Table 6 shows the relationship between employee ownership (dummy variable) and risk.

Insert Table 6

Consistent with my hypothesis, employee ownership (dummy variable) and
idiosyncratic risk is positive and significant at a 1% or better level across the SD of return
and all factor models. The SD of return is 1.365. The range of the factor models is 1.136 to
1.315. The coefficient of the quadratic term is positive across all factor models, implying that
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employee ownership has a dampening effect on risk-taking. However, as reported in Table 3,
the results turn negative and statistically significant at the 1% level or better for the SD of
return as well as for the factor models when the control variables Age (coeff = –0.075) and
Size are introduced. The regression for Table 6 is as follows:

𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
24
∑20
𝑖=1 ∑𝑘=4 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
where
•
•
•
•
•

Risk = a measure of risk (SD of returns as a measure of total risk or SD of residuals
of corresponding factor models as a measure of idiosyncratic risk),
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = the employee-ownership dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
employee ownership is positive,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log(AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.

4.3 Influence of Employee Ownership (Dummy Variable) on R-square
I now analyze the relationship between employee ownership and R-square using a
dummy variable.

Insert Table 7

As Table 7 shows, consistent with my hypothesis, a negative relationship exists
between portfolio R-square and employee ownership (the dummy variable), significant at 1%
or better with all factor models except CAPM, which was significant at the 5% level. The
range of the four models is –0.005 to –0.010. Once again, as in Table 4, the control variable
Age was statistically significant and positive at the 1% level or better across all factor models
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(with a range of 0.0002 to 0.001), and the control variable Size (lagged) was negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level or better for two of the four factor models: CAPM
(coeff = –0.001) and Fung and Hsieh (coeff = –0.002). The regression for Table 7 is as
follows:

𝑅𝑡2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
24
∑20
𝑖=1 ∑𝑘=4 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,

where
•
•
•
•
•

R2 = a measure of factor models fit (R-square of a corresponding factor model
regression),
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = the employee-ownership dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
employee ownership is positive,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size =log (AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 =time factor.
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V.INFLUENCE OF EMPLOYEE-OWNERSHIP RANGES ON PERFORMANCE,
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK AND R-SQUARE
As I now describe, I conducted various tests to analyze and compare the relation and
differences between employee ownership and performance, idiosyncratic risk, and R-square
within quartiles using the control variables of Age and Size.
V.1

Influence of Employee Ownership (Ranges) on Performance
I now analyze the influence of employee ownership on performance using quartiles to

examine the differences between ownership percentages.

Insert Table 8
As Table 8 shows, the results are interesting in that the return and factor models are
uniformly positive and significant to the 1% level or better across the board — with two
exceptions. The return for employee ownership between 50–75% is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level, while employee ownership at 75–100% shows no significance.
The Sharpe ratio is once again negative, with a decreasing range of –0.081 to –0.049. Return
decreases with increased ownership, with the most pronounced effect from the second
quartile (25–50%) to the third quartile (50–75%), of 0.806 to 0.319 to 0.076%. This 0.73%
annual decrease in return could be costly to investors over a 20-year time period. The alpha
also decreases with increased ownership across all models; Carhart (Carhart 1997) shows the
greatest range, with a high of 0.190 in the second quartile to a low of 0.012 in the fourth. The
highest return and alpha figures are in the range of 25–50% employee ownership, implying
that outside ownership SMAs may have a positive effect. This result is in line with Mullally
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(2016), who explored the effects of outside ownership in hedge funds and concluded that
they were positive.

The control variables of Age and Size continued to have similar results as described in
Tables 2 and 5. Age was positive and significant to the 5% level for Return (coeff = 0.013).
As in the previously mentioned tables, Age was negative and significant at the 1% level or
better only in the Fung and Hsieh (Fung and Hsieh 2004) factor model (coeff = –0.003). Size
was negative and significant at the 1% level or better for Return (coeff = –0.282) and across
all factor models, with a range of –0.023 to –0.040. The regression for Table 8 is as follows:
3

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1
𝑖=1
20 26

+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
𝑖=1 𝑘=6

where
•
•
•
•
•

V.2

Return = a performance measure (annual return or a corresponding factor alpha),
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = the employee-ownership quantile factor variable,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log (AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.

Influence of Employee Ownership (Ranges) on Risk
I now analyze the influence of employee ownership on risk using quartiles to

examine the differences between ownership percentages.

Insert Table 9
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As Table 9 shows, the results are again uniformly positive and significant at the 1%
level or better for the SD of returns and across all models. The SD follows the performance
pattern in that it is higher at the lower levels of ownership, with an observation of 1.853 in
the second quartile, and then decreases in a linear and rather pronounced way to 0.707 in the
fourth quartile. The risk is also reduced across the board, with the highest observation in
CAPM of 1.788 in the second quartile and the lowest observation in Fung and Hsieh (Fung
and Hsieh, 2004) of 0.615 in the fourth quartile. This result continues to strengthen the
hypothesis that higher ownership leads to a decrease in risk-taking activity.

Also, adding the control variables of Age and Size (lagged) have an observed effect
on decreasing risk-taking. Age and Size were negative and significant to the 1% level or
better for both SD of return: Age (coeff = –0.071) and Size (coeff = –0.163) and in all factor
models with a range of –0.044 from the Fung and Hsieh model (Fung and Hsieh 2004) to –
0.069 in CAPM for Age, and a range of –0.058 from the Fung and Hsieh model (Fund and
Hsieh 2004) to –0.150 for CAPM. The regression for Table 9 is as follows:

𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + ∑3𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
26
∑20
𝑖=1 ∑𝑘=6 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
where
•
•
•
•
•

Risk = a measure of risk (SD of returns as a measure of total risk or SD of residuals
of corresponding factor models as a measure of idiosyncratic risk),
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = the employee-ownership quantile factor variable,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log (AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.
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V.3

Influence of Employee Ownership (Ranges) on R-square
I now analyze the influence of employee ownership on R-square using quartiles to

examine the differences between ownership percentages.

Insert Table 10

As Table 10 shows, the results of the analysis on R-square proved to be a mixed bag.
The only model that showed significance at the 1% level or better across all ranges was the
Carhart model (Carhart 1997). The observations were negative beginning in the second
quartile (coeff = –0.013) and decreased in a linear manner to the third quartile (coeff = –
0.008) and finally to the fourth quartile (coeff = –0.007). Age was positive and significant at
the 1% level across all models with a range of 0.0002 to 0.001. Size was negative and
statistically significant as observed only in CAPM (coeff = –0.001) and the Fung and Hsieh
model (coeff = –.0002) (Fung and Hsieh 2004). The regression for Table 10 is as follows:

𝑅𝑡2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + ∑3𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
26
∑20
𝑖=1 ∑𝑘=6 𝛽𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
where
•
•
•
•
•

R2 = a measure of factor models fit (R-square of a corresponding factor model
regression),
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = the employee-ownership quantile factor variable,
Age = total period of reporting in years,
Size = log (AUM), and
𝜑𝑡 = time factor.
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VI.ACADEMIC DISCUSSION
In this paper, I accomplished two objectives: I explained the relationship between
employee ownership of advisory firms and SMAs in terms of performance, risk, and Rsquare; and I defined SMAs as an asset structure and described how they differ from other
structures, such as mutual funds and hedge funds. Defining and then differentiating SMAs
from hedge and mutual funds was critical as it helps situate the study’s results within a
broader context. Mullally (2016) examined hedge fund advisors that sell ownership stakes;
the implication being that hedge fund managers were full owners of their respective funds at
a point prior. Unlike mutual funds, which are dominated by a few large firms with de
minimis employee ownership, SMAs sit at the crossroads, with some advisory firms having
substantial employee ownership, while others have no employee ownership. SMAs are thus a
unique structure through which to study the ownership phenomena and perhaps generalize
the benefits of ownership across structures.
My results confirmed the tested hypotheses. In testing performance between the two
distinct groups of separate account management firms — those with and without employee
ownership — I found that the employee-owned firms strongly outperformed the nonemployee-owned firms from a total return perspective over the 20-year study.
My first hypothesis was that SMA portfolios managed by employees with a stake in
the firm would outperform those managed by those without a stake in the firm. I confirmed
this hypothesis, with the results showing that the employee-owned SMA portfolios
outperformed non-employee-owned SMA portfolios by an average of 0.338% annualized
over the life of the study. The most notable outperformance here was in the 25–50%
ownership range, which reported an average outperformance of 0.806% annualized over the
study period. These two results are in line with the findings of Elton, Gruber and Blake
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(2013) who noted that partnerships, which are employee-owned by definition, outperformed
all other management structures for SMA portfolios. Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013) also
found that institutional fund portfolios run by people employed by investment banks
underperformed those who weren’t. This is their paper’s key finding; after all, performance
is the one requisite ingredient for a firm’s survival and long-term success. Although flows
are the direct mechanism for a firm’s increased revenue, without performance, firms
eventually wither and die. This follows on Lim and Weisbach (2016), who found that,
among money management firms, good current performance is an indirect incentive as it
increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. Further, in their study, the
best performance seems to have come from firms that included outside ownership of up to
75% of their company. This leads to further questions about who these outside owners are
and what their role is in determining manager success. My results also bode well for the
literature stream on SMA portfolio performance persistence led by Busse, Goyal, and Wahal
(2010). In finding that employee-owned firms outperform non-employee-owned firms, it
would follow that flows would increase and thus further benefit the manager. In reporting on
investor behavior following outperformance, Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993), Del
Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Heisler et al. (2007) all find that flows did increase and
persist, thus leading to a virtuous cycle rewarding both manager and investor.
My second hypothesis — that employee-owned SMA portfolio managers take more
idiosyncratic risks than their non-employee-owned counterparts — was also validated by the
study’s results. The standard deviation was 1.365 with employee-owned portfolios versus
non-employee-owned using a dummy variable; the observation was most pronounced at the
ownership range of 25–50%, which is similar to the performance measurement’s result of
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1.853. This risk result aligns with Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) who found that
idiosyncratic risk matters in achieving higher returns.

My third hypothesis — that R-square would be lower with employee-owned versus
non-employee-owned SMA portfolio managers — was also observed. In each regression I
ran, the sign was consistently negative and significant. These results support Titman and Tiu
(2011), who asserted that higher-performing portfolios usually exhibited a lower correlation
to the market, as reflected in the R-square result.
I have offered several potential explanations for the risk result, which I think is the
most interesting finding to emerge from this research. The most logical explanation is that
managers who open their own firms already have a strong track record of success. If their
record had been mediocre, the likelihood of their leaving an existing position and bringing
clients with them would be very low. So, opening a firm strongly suggests that the
founders/portfolio managers are better skilled and more confident than their counterparts in
non-employee-owned firms both at identifying risk and capitalizing on it to provide higher
returns. This follows the logic expressed by Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2010) and
Chevalier and Ellison (1998), who found that higher-performing managers tended to be
richly rewarded, while lower-performing managers tend to disappear from the investing
industry.
A second possible explanation is that the incentives for a portfolio manager to avoid
herd behavior are strong. In an industry as competitive and transparent as portfolio
management, managers have strong incentives to outperform. If you outperform your peers
and are on the right platforms, you will have a strong flow of dollars to manage. If you
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underperform, the barriers to investors leaving you are essentially only the tax consequences
of the change; positions can be liquidated and the money sent to a new manager in a single
day. By their very nature, employee-owned firms are much less likely to have as high a
turnover as non-employee-owned firms. In an employee-owned firm, when you fire the
portfolio manager, you are, in effect, firing yourself; as a result, a fund shuts down. In the
mutual fund industry, turnover is more common. Kostovetsky and Warner (2015) studied the
period 1995–2009 and found that approximately 14% of all portfolio managers were
terminated annually, resulting in 11,405 departures. The most common correlation they
found was between termination and fund underperformance. Chevalier and Ellison (1998)
also found that mutual fund managers were terminated for performance-related reasons.
According to their research, younger managers were more likely to be terminated than older
ones, leading portfolio managers to avoid unsystematic risk and to tend toward herd behavior
and investments in more conventional portfolio investments. In their work, Guerrieri and
Kondor (2009) described the “reputational premium” phenomenon: when investors believe
managers have the talent to perform, those managers are more willing to take on default risk
to avoid being fired. Once those managers gamble and take on a higher risk profile, one of
two things happens: they are rewarded for that risk with higher performance or they are fired.
The ones who are rewarded then have other options, such as to move to a hedge fund or
another mutual fund for higher compensation. Depending on their experience, the ones who
are fired are likely to resume their career in the mutual fund industry at another firm.
Managers who do not take on a higher risk profile are likely to exhibit herding behavior,
purchasing securities that are in line with the style standard and thus greatly reducing their
ability to outperform their competitors.
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One final and somewhat controversial finding that merits discussion is that, although
there is a clear and beneficial difference in performance between firms that have employeeownership and those that don’t, as firms increase their percentage of employee ownership,
they seem to obtain higher returns at the expense of higher risk. This is revealed through the
negative coefficient for the Sharpe ratio when interpreting the effect of employee ownership
on performance. The summary statistic on the Sharpe ratio was positive, which suggests that
the firms with higher employee ownership take more risks to achieve higher returns; this
suggestion was reiterated in the findings on risk. It is certainly an area that merits further
study.
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VII.PRACTITIONER DISCUSSION
This paper contributes to industry practitioners in two key ways that parallel the
academic discussion. First and foremost, I have identified one easily sortable characteristic
that can help even novice investors choose better managers. As a practitioner for nearly 25
years, this idea was a driving factor of my research. My results show that investors looking at
SMAs can benefit from asking one simple question: “Does the advisory firm have employee
ownership? By choosing an employee-owned SMA, investors immediately give themselves a
higher likelihood of ultimately capturing that 0.338–0.806% of annual outperformance over
time.
As investors grow more sophisticated, they can look at the percentage of employee
ownership to gain further potential advantage. My results indicate that 25–50% employee
ownership is optimal for achieving the highest portfolio performance. In such cases, at least
50% of the firm’s ownership is external to the employees, which constitutes a strong
influence and thus might increase the portfolio manager’s discipline. As the ownership
grows above 50%, the benefit dissipates in a linear fashion, but is still present at 100%
ownership. The tradeoff here seems to be that the managers are taking more risks than their
counterparts to get their returns, as manifested by a negative Sharpe coefficient. In plain
language, this typically means higher volatility. Thus, investors with shorter time horizons
might want to exercise caution when investing in these portfolios, as timing may matter more
than in portfolios at firms with a lower percentage of employee ownership.
Also in this paper, I give a clear working definition and description of an SMA. In
simple terms, I compare and contrast SMAs with both mutual funds and hedge funds,
describe their possible benefits to investors, and situate them in the investing world. I then
test a general rule: people with ownership positions outperform those without them. I
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carefully follow the rules of science required to make a statement about any financial
subject, including getting robust and reliable data, formulating hypotheses, running
regressions, finding significance, and arriving at critically examined conclusions. As a result,
I can say to practitioners that SMA managers with some level of corporate employee
ownership have historically had higher returns than those without that ownership. Further, I
can say that they have achieved these returns by taking more risks and have been less
correlated to the market overall.
My final contribution to practitioners is to give them another tool to help them
differentiate among SMAs when choosing to invest. In their conclusion, Coggan, Fabozzi,
and Rahman (1993) challenged researchers to do more to discover some of the
characteristics that make successful money managers. As the Informa database notes, as an
investment professional, I have the ability to invest in more than 14,000 SMAs. After
deciding the amount to allocate to equities and fixed income, then the amount to allocate to
Small Cap versus Large Cap, or Value versus Growth, or International versus Domestic, I’m
still left with hundreds of investable portfolios in each category. I hope that adding this
indicator will be useful to my fellow investment professionals when making allocation
decisions.
Finally, for both academics and practitioners, I hope that my explanation of what an
SMA is will help them understand this important and growing segment of the investment
universe.
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VIII.TABLES
Table 1: Summary table
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables. The dependent variable is % of Employee
Ownership. Return is an annualized return. Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of the monthly
returns on corresponding factors of the CAPM, Fama and French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models.
Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. SD of Return is the annualized standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk
is the annualized SD of residuals in the corresponding factor models. R-sqr is the R-square of the
corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age,
assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural
logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
Statistic

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

141,392

51.150

44.700

0.000

100.000

Return

154,725

9.021

14.550

–18.260

34.040

Sharpe

154,705

0.880

1.426

–2.001

3.825

CAPM Alpha

154,725

0.617

1.232

–1.737

2.759

Fama and French Alpha

154,725

0.895

1.380

–1.880

3.311

Carhart Alpha

154,725

1.109

1.525

–2.192

3.748

Fung and Hsieh Alpha

154,725

0.745

1.876

–2.805

3.888

SD of Return

154,725

12.190

8.324

0.000

133.600

CAPM Idiosyncratic Risk

154,725

11.680

8.141

0.000

132.700

Fama and French Idiosyncratic Risk

154,725

10.520

7.455

0.000

132.500

Carhart Idiosyncratic Risk

154,725

9.878

7.117

0.000

132.200

Fung and Hsieh Idiosyncratic Risk

154,725

6.830

5.266

0.000

94.290

CAPM R-sqr

154,724

0.091

0.127

0.000

0.901

Fama and French R-sqr

154,724

0.264

0.173

0.000

0.998

Carhart R-sqr

154,724

0.354

0.188

0.001

1.000

Fung and Hsieh R-sqr

154,724

0.659

0.188

0.039

1.000

% of Employee Ownership
Performance measures

Risk measures

R-sqr measures

Control variables
Age

154,725

8.49

6.026

0.417

30.92

Size

120,874

5.431

2.372

–4.605

13.21
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Table 2: Influence of the employee ownership % on performance
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. Return is an annualized
return. Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of monthly returns on corresponding factors of the CAPM,
Fama and French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models. Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. Age (measured in years)
is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being
reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized
at 1% and 99%.

Return

CAPM
Alpha

Fama and
French
Alpha

Carhart
Alpha

Fung and
Hsieh
Alpha

Sharpe
Ratio

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.001

0.0001**

0.0003***

0.001***

0.0003***

–0.001***

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.012**

0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

–0.003***

0.006***

(0.006)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

–0.284***

–0.024***

–0.034***

–0.040***

–0.024***

–0.004**

(0.015)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

17.910***

1.090***

0.756***

0.671***

2.165***

1.060***

(0.233)

(0.020)

(0.023)

(0.027)

(0.030)

(0.025)

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,008

0.530

0.543

0.485

0.445

0.520

0.436

0.530

0.543

0.485

0.445

0.520

0.436

% of Employee
Ownership

Age

Size (lagged)

Observations
R-sqr
Adjusted R-sqr
*

**

p <0.1; p <0.05;

***

p <0.01
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Table 3: Influence of the employee ownership % on risk
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. SD of Return is the annualized
standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk is the annualized SD of residuals in the corresponding factor models.
Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month
of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM.

SD of Return

CAPM
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Fama and
French
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Carhart
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Fung and
Hsieh
Idiosyncratic
Risk

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.008***

0.008***

0.007***

0.007***

0.004***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

–0.074***

–0.073***

–0.064***

–0.061***

–0.046***

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.003)

–0.165***

–0.152***

–0.144***

–0.134***

–0.059***

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.009)

(0.007)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

10.090***

9.855***

8.708***

7.871***

5.092***

(0.174)

(0.169)

(0.157)

(0.149)

(0.109)

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

0.233

0.220

0.228

0.230

0.233

0.220

0.228

0.230

% of Employee
Ownership

Age

Size (lagged)

Observations

0.224
R-sqr
Adjusted R0.224
sqr
*
p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01
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Table 4: Influence of the employee ownership % on R-sqr
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. R-sqr is the
R-square of the corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of
the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the
database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM.

(1)

Fama and
French
R-sqr
(2)

–0.00002***

–0.0001***

–0.0001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0002***

0.0002***

0.001***

0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

–0.001***

0.000

0.000

–0.002***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

0.032***

0.213***

0.399***

0.750***

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.003)

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

R-sqr

0.433

0.378

0.327

0.385

Adjusted R-sqr

0.433

0.378

0.327

0.385

CAPM
R-sqr

% of Employee
Ownership

Age

Size (lagged)

Observations

*

p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01

Carhart
R-sqr

Fung and
Hsieh R-sqr

(3)

(4)
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Table 5: Influence of employee ownership (dummy variable) on performance
This table reports the regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. Return is an annualized
return. Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of the monthly returns on corresponding factors of the
CAPM, Fama and French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models. Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. Age (measured in
years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being
reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized at
1% and 99%.

Return

CAPM
Alpha

Fama and
French
Alpha

Carhart
Alpha

Fung and
Hsieh
Alpha

Sharpe
Ratio

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.338***

0.038***

0.081***

0.120***

0.044***

–0.071***

(0.072)

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.008)

0.011*

0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

–0.003***

0.006***

(0.006)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

–0.277***

–0.023***

–0.033***

–0.040***

–0.025***

–0.003**

(0.014)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

17.670***

1.066***

0.711***

0.610***

2.146***

1.082***

Employee
ownership
dummy (1/0)

Age

Size (lagged)

Observations

(0.235)

(0.020)

(0.023)

(0.027)

(0.031)

(0.025)

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,008

0.544

0.486

0.446

0.520

0.436

0.543

0.486

0.446

0.520

0.436

0.531
R-sqr
Adjusted R0.530
sqr
*
p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01
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Table 6: Influence of employee ownership (dummy variable) on risk
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. SD of Return is
annualized standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk is the annualized SD of residuals in
corresponding factor models. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming
product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of
AUM.

SD of
Return

CAPM
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Fama and
French
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Carhart
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Fung and
Hsieh
Idiosyncratic
Risk

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Employee
ownership dummy
(1/0)

1.365***

1.313***

1.199***

1.136***

0.794***

(0.054)

(0.052)

(0.048)

(0.046)

(0.034)

Age

–0.075***

–0.073***

–0.064***

–0.062***

–0.047***

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.003)

–0.165***

–0.153***

–0.145***

–0.135***

–0.059***

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.009)

(0.007)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

9.472***

9.272***

8.186***

7.376***

4.734***

(0.175)

(0.170)

(0.158)

(0.150)

(0.110)

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

0.227

0.236

0.223

0.231

0.233

0.227

0.236

0.223

0.231

0.233

Size (lagged)

Observations
R-sqr
Adjusted R-sqr
*

**

p <0.1; p <0.05;

***

p <0.01

the
the
the
the
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Table 7: Influence of employee ownership (dummy variable) on R-sqr
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. R-sqr is the R-square of
the corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age,
assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural
logarithm of the AUM.

CAPM
R-sqr

Fama and
French
R-sqr

Carhart
R-sqr

Fung and
Hsieh R-sqr

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Employee
ownership dummy
(1/0)

–0.001**

–0.007***

–0.010***

–0.005***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Age

0.0002***

0.0002***

0.001***

0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

–0.001***

0.000

0.000

–0.002***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

0.031***

0.215***

0.402***

0.753***

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.003)

Observations

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

0.433

0.378

0.328

0.385

0.433

0.378

0.328

0.385

Size (lagged)

R-sqr
Adjusted R-sqr
*

**

p <0.1; p <0.05;

***

p <0.01
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Table 8: Influence of employee ownership (ranges) on performance
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. Return is an annualized return.
Alphas are intercepts of linear regressions of the monthly returns on corresponding factors of the CAPM, Fama and
French, Carhart, and Fung and Hsieh models. Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio. Age (measured in years) is an
approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month of being reported to the
database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM. Return, Alphas, and Sharpe are winsorized at 1% and 99%.

(1)

CAPM
Alpha
(2)

Fama and
French Alpha
(3)

Carhart
Alpha
(4)

Fung and
Hsieh Alpha
(5)

Sharpe
Ratio
(6)

Employee ownership
(>25% & =<50%)

0.806***

0.076***

0.135***

0.190***

0.095***

–0.081***

(0.146)

(0.012)

(0.014)

(0.017)

(0.019)

(0.015)

Employee ownership
(>50% & =<75%)

0.319**

0.036***

0.081***

0.107***

0.051***

–0.076***

(0.135)

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.015)

(0.017)

(0.014)

Employee ownership
(>75% & =<100%)

0.076

0.012**

0.032***

0.054***

0.027***

–0.049***

(0.069)

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.007)

Age

0.013**

0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

–0.003***

0.006***

(0.006)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

–0.282***

–0.023***

–0.033***

–0.040***

–0.024***

–0.004**

(0.015)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

17.850***

1.085***

0.748***

0.661***

2.158***

1.063***

(0.233)

(0.020)

(0.023)

(0.026)

(0.030)

(0.025)

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,008

0.531

0.544

0.486

0.446

0.520

0.436

0.530

0.543

0.486

0.446

0.520

0.436

Return

Size (lagged)

Observations
R-sqr.
Adjusted R-sqr
*

**

p <0.1; p <0.05;

***

p <0.01
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Table 9: Influence of employee ownership (ranges) on risk
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. SD of Return is the annualized
standard deviation of returns. Idiosyncratic risk is annualized SD of residuals in corresponding factor models. Age
(measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the product was launched in the first month
of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM.

SD of
Return

CAPM
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Fama and French
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Carhart
Idiosyncratic
Risk

Fung and Hsieh
Idiosyncratic
Risk

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Employee
ownership (>25%
& =<50%)

1.853***

1.788***

1.642***

1.571***

1.013***

(0.109)

(0.106)

(0.098)

(0.093)

(0.068)

Employee
ownership (>50%
& =<75%)

1.299***

1.255***

1.137***

1.090***

0.756***

(0.100)

(0.097)

(0.090)

(0.086)

(0.063)

Employee
ownership (>75%
& =<100%)

0.707***

0.696***

0.649***

0.615***

0.409***

(0.051)

(0.050)

(0.046)

(0.044)

(0.032)

Age

–0.071***
(0.004)

–0.069***
(0.004)

–0.061***
(0.004)

–0.058***
(0.004)

–0.044***
(0.003)

Size (lagged)

–0.163***

–0.150***

–0.141***

–0.132***

–0.058***

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.009)

(0.007)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

9.997***
(0.173)
101,022

9.766***
(0.169)
101,022

8.627***
(0.156)
101,022

7.793***
(0.148)
101,022

5.045***
(0.109)
101,022

0.226

0.235

0.222

0.230

0.232

0.226

0.235

0.222

0.230

0.232

Observations
R-sqr
Adjusted R-sqr
*

**

p <0.1; p <0.05;

***

p <0.01
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Table 10: Influence of employee ownership (ranges) on R-sqr
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. R-sqr is the R-square of
corresponding factor regressions. Age (measured in years) is an approximation of the product’s age, assuming the
product was launched in the first month of being reported to the database. Size is a natural logarithm of the AUM.
CAPM
R-sqr

Fama and French Rsqr

Carhart
R-sqr

Fung and Hsieh Rsqr

(1)

(2)

(4)

Employee ownership (>25% &
=<50%)

–0.004***

–0.010***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(3)
–
0.013***
(0.002)

Employee ownership (>50% &
=<75%)

–0.002

–0.003*

(0.001)

(0.002)

Employee ownership (>75% &
=<100%)

–0.002***

–0.006***

(0.001)

(0.001)

–
0.007***
(0.001)

Age

0.0002***

0.0002***

0.001***

0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

–
0.008***
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)
–0.004*
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)

–0.001***

0.000

0.000

–0.002***

–0.0001

–0.0002

–0.0002

–0.0002

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

0.032***

0.213***

0.399***

0.750***

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.003)

101,022

101,022

101,022

101,022

R-sqr

0.433

0.378

0.328

0.385

Adjusted R-sqr

0.433

0.378

0.328

0.385

Size (lagged)

Observations

*

p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01
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Table 11: Pairwise mean difference analysis
This table reports p-values of pairwise mean difference analysis of mean returns and standard deviation of returns of
corresponding groups of SMAs based on employee ownership. ANOVA analysis showed statistically significant
difference of means for both measures.
2. a Mean difference analysis of performance (Returns)
[0,25]

(25,50]

(25,50]

0.000

(50,75]

0.005

0.231

(75,100]

0.000

0.061

(50,75]

0.711

2. b Mean difference analysis of risk (SD of Returns)
[0,25]

(25,50]

(25,50]

0.000

(50,75]

0.000

0.000

(75,100]

0.000

0.000

(50,75]

0.000
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IX.EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1: Mean returns
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Exhibit 2: Mean SD of Returns
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Definition of Variables

Variable
Description
% Employee Ownership Variable that describes whether or not the reporting portfolio
has any employee ownership at the company level, and if so,
what percentage
Performance Variables
Return
Average annual return of the portfolios from 1995 to 2015
Sharpe Ratio
Annualized average of the portfolios excess returns (e.g., the
return minus the risk-free rate) divided by the standard
deviation of its returns over the same period
CAPM Alpha
Alpha for the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe,1966) is
calculated using equation (1)
Fama and French Alpha Alpha for the Fama and French three-factor model (Fama and
French 1993) is calculated using equation (2)
Carhart Alpha
Alpha of the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) is
calculated using equation (3)
Fung and Hsieh Alpha
Alpha for the Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model (Fung and
Hsieh, 2004) is calculated using equation (4)
Control Variables
Age
The number of months the firm was reporting
Size
Assets under management (AUM) in millions
Risk Measures
Standard Deviation of
The average annual return volatility of the portfolios for 1995–
Return
2015
CAPM Idiosyncratic
See CAPM Alpha for equation
Risk
Fama and French
See Fama and French Alpha for equation
Idiosyncratic Risk
Carhart Idiosyncratic
See Carhart Alpha for equation
Risk
Fung and Hsieh
See Fung and Hsieh Alpha for equation
Idiosyncratic Risk
R-square Measures
CAPM R-square
See CAPM Alpha for equation
Fama and French RSee Fama and French Alpha for equation
square
Carhart R-square
See Carhart Alpha for equation
Fung and Hsieh RSee Fung and Hsieh Alpha for equation
square
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Appendix B: Data Gathering Process: Informa Investment Solutions Example
This screenshot shows an example of how the database is aggregated and then divided for access. The top
left column lets users search by field and offers drop-down menus for specific information on the firm,
products, and performance. Once users select a particular characteristic, such as “rate of return,” the
information moves to the middle column. They can then separate the information further by choosing
particular characteristics or time frames in the box on the right. The portfolio database then calculates the
requested data and displays it alongside each portfolio at the bottom of the page.
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Appendix C: Characteristics of SMAs vs. Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds
The following table compares the characteristics of separately managed accounts (SMAs), hedge funds, and
mutual funds. The table summarizes work from Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013); Busse, Goyal, and
Wahal (2010); Del Guercio and Tkac (2000); and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2013), a well as my own 25
years of experience in the field.

Characteristics of SMAs, Hedge Funds, and Mutual Funds
SMA

Mutual Fund

Hedge Fund

Registration

None

Yes, under Investment
Act of 1940

Yes, if greater than
$150mm AUM

Minimums

$100k to $25 mm

$250 to $10,000

$250k to $25mm

Fees

Negotiable

Fixed at share class

Fixed at share class

Incentives

Rare

Rare

Usual

High Water Marks

Rare

Rare

Usual

Board Oversight

No

Yes

Yes

Assets Held

Individual securities

Pooled

Pooled

Tax

Individual

Pooled

Pooled

Reporting

Not required to report
returns to SEC

Required to report
returns

Required to report
returns if registered

Customizable

Yes

No

No

Compensated by
Percentage of AUM

Yes

Yes

Yes

Incentive for Risk
Shifting

Neutral

High

High

Flow in Relation to
Performance

Linear

Highly convex

Highly convex

Investor Accreditation
Required

No

No

Yes

Allocated by a
Professional

Usually

Sometimes

Usually

Style Specific Mandate

Often

Often

Varies

Window Dressing
Present

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix D: Informa Gathers Ownership Data
Informa gathers ownership data through the following question:
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Appendix E: Sample Firms
Following are basic information about two sample firms — one employee-owned and the other nonemployee-owned, as well as further information copied from the “About Us” section of each firm’s
website.

Hahn Capital Management
LLC

BlackRock

Employee ownership at
manager level*

Yes

No

Total AUM

$1.6 Billion

$4.89 Trillion

Number of employees
Corporate structure
Year founded

10
Private/ LLC
1988

12,000
Public
1988

*as self-reported by Informa Investment Solutions

Employee-owned firm: Hahn Capital
http://www.hahncap.com/index.html

About Hahn Capital Management
Hahn Capital Management, LLC, is a boutique, value-focused investment management
firm based in San Francisco, California. We specialize in buying shares of mid-sized
companies with a market capitalization between $1 Billion and $20 Billion.
The firm was founded on the investment philosophy that risk management is the key to
superior and consistent equity returns over long periods of time. The protection of our
clients’ investment capital is at the core of our investment decision process, so when
analyzing each business opportunity, the first question we ask is: “How much can we
lose?” Once this question is addressed, we then examine the potential investment return.
The firm was founded in 1988 by Elaine F. Hahn. It is 100% employee-owned, as we
believe that all professionals in the firm should have the opportunity to share in the
growth and success of the business through equity ownership.
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Our diverse group of clients includes public institutions, corporations, family offices,
separately managed account (SMA) and unified managed account (UMA) programs, as
well as high net worth individuals. We strive to provide the highest quality of service to
our clients, irrespective of the size of each portfolio.
Our team of investment professionals has extensive experience in market and security
analysis, portfolio management and client service. More important, we share the values
and goals that have served our clients well over the years: honesty, trustworthiness,
dedication to excellence, and a passion for the investment business.

Non-employee-owned firm: BlackRock
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/about-us
BlackRock is trusted to manage more money than any other investment firm*. Our
business is investing on behalf of our clients — from large institutions to parents and
grandparents, teachers, nurses, doctors and people from all walks of life who entrust their
savings to us.
We work only for our clients. Our promise is to give them insight into what to do with
their money, providing products and services that can help them build a better financial
future.
Global capabilities
BlackRock has world-class capabilities designed for our clients’ greatest needs, with a
comprehensive range of products and services across asset classes, geographies and
investment strategies. We have expertise in every region around the world, with 135
investment teams in 30 countries sharing their best thinking in order to seek better
returns.
Who we serve
Our clients come from every corner of the globe. They are governments, companies,
foundations, and millions of individuals saving for retirement, their children’s educations
and a better life.
Our singular focus
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We’re passionate about our work and intensely focused on performing at the highest
levels. To get there, we strive to out-think and out-work competitors and find the best
balance of risk and return across all investment styles on behalf of our clients.
Responsibility
As a fiduciary for our clients and as public company, our focus is long-term
sustainability. We aim to be a responsible corporate citizen and to take into account
environmental, social and governance issues that have real and quantifiable financial
impacts over the long-term for our firm and the firms in which we invest. Long-term
responsibility and sustainability are integrated into our business model and shareholder
value creation framework and in the way we conduct our business, serve our clients and
give back to the communities in which we and our clients live and work.
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Appendix F: Database Definitions
The following are Informa’s definitions of the accounts used to aggregate the database from which I
gathered the reports.

Account Name
Managed Account (Wrap)

Definition
This code is used to identify any wrap
product, managed account, or wrap fee
arrangement.

Limited Partnership (LP)

A business organization with one or more
general partners who manage the business
and assume legal debts and obligations, and
one or more limited partners who are liable
only to the extent of their investments.
Representative compilation of accounts
managed on an account-by-account basis
subscribing to the same product style.

Separate Account Composite

Single Representative Account

One account (out of many existing
accounts) managed in a way that is
representative of the account management
style.
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